One, the objection is so patently fallacious that it seemed insulting to suggest that any reader would raise it. My second motive was less charitable: knowing how irrational some ultra-Darwinists can be, I knew some of them would raise the objection anyway, and in the process, perform invaluable rhetorical work for the cause of intelligent design.

Bottaro's response exceeded my expectations. He begins with a favorite Darwinist tactic of reassuring readers that the evidential goods for their position are somewhere offstage, truckloads of it apparently too tedious to actually go into:

I’ll just pass on discussing Witt’s rather simplistic ideas about modern cosmology and abiogenesis, not to mention the history of science, since his arguments are just a rehash of well-known ID and Creationist talking points that have been abundantly critiqued before.

With the substance of my post neatly dispensed with, Bottaro is now free to argue that "every fallacy of modern ID inferences can be found in Lowell’s book" about the supposed Martian canals:

• "You will find confident claims about the manifestly non-natural basis of the observed structures." In other words: Lowell expressed confidence in his design inference. Design theorists have expressed confidence in their design inferences. Lowell's confidence was misplaced. Ergo, the design theorists' confidence is misplaced. Bottaro’s fallacy: hasty generalization.

• "You will find references [in Lowell's argument] to diagnostic features of basic human design, and analogies with known designed structures." In other words: Since Lowell's set of diagnostic features proved misleading, all sets of diagnostic features will prove misleading. And since Lowell's analogies with known designed structures proved misleading, all analogies with designed structures will prove misleading. Bottaro’s fallacy: hasty generalization.

• "Specious mathematical/probabilistic arguments and analogies are there, too." In other words, because we know that Lowell's mathematical/probabilistic arguments and analogies to design were specious, all mathematical/probabilistic arguments and analogies to design are specious. Bottaro’s fallacy: hasty generalization.

The way for Bottaro to rescue his fallacious argument would be to show that a design theorist made the same specific sort of mistake that Lowell had made. Lowell inferred design from the appearance of three lines crossing on what was (in terms of Lowell's situation as an observer) a two-dimensional surface observed at low resolution. Dembski, who holds a Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of Chicago, rules out chance explanations when the probability for something dips below 1 chance in 10 the 150th power (1 followed by 150 zeroes), and then insists on ruling out law-like explanations as well before inferring design (Cambridge University Press thought his methodology was sound enough that they published his monograph on the subject). Clearly, the two probabilistic arguments are highly dissimilar. If one wants to rebut Dembski's argument, one will have to address the details of Dembski's argument, not those of a radically different one posed by someone else.

• "Strikingly, you will even find claims that the “overwhelming impression of design” is prima facie evidence of actual design." But design theorists merely argue that if something in nature looks designed, scientists should be willing to consider the possibility that (1) it was designed and (2) that we may even be able to rationally reconstruct our intuitive design inference. Bottaro’s fallacy: strawman.

• "Just like ID advocates who, in order to support their design inference, find themselves forced to conflate function with purpose, so did Lowell have to justify the existence of this elaborate channel system with some sort of anthropomorphic goal. He thus claimed that, since Mars is clearly a dry planet, the existence of channels was entirely justified as part of an irrigation system." In other words, since Lowell's argument from function to purpose proved false, all such arguments are spurious. Bottaro’s fallacy: hasty generalization. In reality, the vast majority of inferences we make from function to purpose are true. Even as children we accurately make countless such inferences concerning the things around us, usually unconsciously (e.g., “That machine functions to evenly cut the grass; its purpose is probably to evenly cut grass.”

• Bottaro concedes that design theorists generally identify the function of things more effectively than Lowell did when examining the Martian "canals." But he continues, "When faced with structures whose functional properties are unknown, ID advocates do not fare much better than Lowell: for instance, Jonathan Wells has claimed that since centrioles (which are sub-cellular structures of unclear function that participate in the cell division process) look superficially like man-made turbines, they must be, and he built around this spurious assumption a whole fanciful model of what teeny-weeny turbines could actually be doing in the context of eukaryotic cell division.”

This is more strawman thrashing from Bottaro. Wells argues that since centrioles look superficially like man-made turbines, why not explore the possibility that they are turbines. Having done just that, he points to additional evidence that they are indeed turbines, and outlines a way to test his idea.

He also suggests that one motivation for assuming that they aren't sophisticated little turbines is that such machines would provide additional evidence of design at the microbiological level, and some scientists have been taught to look for anything but evidence for design. Since Wells is under no such strictures, he's free to explore the possibility that these apparent turbines are actual turbines, and to develop a testable scientific model to explain what they "could actually be doing in the context of eukaryotic cell division."

Bottaro calls Wells’ model "fanciful." By fanciful does he mean wrong? Unlikely? On what grounds does he conclude this? Is he interested in the fact that Wells has proposed a way to test his model? Or that his model, if true, could lead to improved methods of preventing cancer? Since scientists in the past have described as “fanciful” various scientific models that later turned out to be true, does that mean Wells’ model is also true? According to Bottaro’s method of reasoning (hasty generalization) the answer is yes.

• Finally, Bottaro concludes by noting that I confessed to having learned Darwinist jargon at one point. He encourages the reader to conclude from this that my arguments against neo-Darwinism should be rejected out of hand. Let’s reconstruct the logical sequence, with the implicit premises drawn out into the light: People who learned Darwinist jargon as adults can never make good arguments concerning Darwinism. Jonathan Witt learned Darwinist jargon as an adult. Ergo, he’s a poopy head.

Thanks Andrea. The next time someone asks me what I’m doing in an origins science debate, I can point to this exchange between a former English Professor and a Professor of Medicine.